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Abstract: Scientific realists are committed to the claim that scientific
discourse should be interpreted realistically, so that theoretical terms are
understood as putatively referring expressions that have putative reference
to empirical entities. In order to argue against realistic interpretation, I
draw on an episode from the history of chemistry. One of the hypothetical
entities of late 18th century chemistry was the muriatic radical, a hitherto
unknown element that was thought to be a constituent of muriatic acid. I
argue that the term ‘muriatic radical’ resists realistic interpretation, and
that we should therefore refrain from interpreting discourse concerning
hypothetical entities realistically.
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1. Introduction
When scientists put forward hypotheses, these hypotheses occasionally
introduce entities that would inflate the ontology of their theories, and
some of these entities are hypothetical entities. The sense of ‘hypothetical
entity’ that I am interested in is given by the following rough guide.
A hypothetical entity is a new (kind of) entity that a scientist
puts forward as a (kind of) empirical entity in advance of
decisive empirical reasons to do so.1
An empirical entity is an entity that exists in the natural world. ‘Decisive
empirical reasons’ should be understood with reference to the consensus of
the scientific community. The consensus need not be unanimous, but the
reasons in question should be capable of eventually convincing the vast
majority of the scientific community. For some examples of hypothetical
entities, think of the planet hypothesized by John Adams and Urbain Le
Verrier in the mid-19th century, or Antoine Lavoisier’s caloric in the late
18th century, or the Higgs boson today. It should be emphasized that
‘entity’ in ‘hypothetical entity’ need not mean ‘empirical entity.’ Insofar as
Lavoisier’s caloric, for example, is a hypothetical entity, it is an entity in
1This rough guide is roughly in agreement with the account of hypothetical
entities developed by Rynasiewicz, Steinert-Threlkeld, and Suri (2010, 10).
much the same way that an abstract or fictional entity is an entity.
Terms introduced to name hypothetical entities are what I will call
HE terms, short for hypothetical entity terms. Here and throughout, I use
the word ‘name’ in a slightly technical sense that doesn’t entail that
reference to an empirical entity is successful. This is important since some
hypothetical entities, like caloric, are no longer thought to exist.
Hypothetical entities should not be equated with unobservable
entities. To be sure, some hypothetical entities are unobservable, like
Lavoisier’s caloric. But some hypothetical entities, like that put forward by
Adams and Le Verrier, are observable. And some unobservable entities, like
the electron, are no longer hypothetical.
Hypothetical entities should also not be equated with theoretical
entities. Following van Fraassen (1980, 14) and Chakravartty (2011, §1.1), I
take it that a theoretical term is just a term that occurs in a scientific
theory, as opposed to a term that names an unobservable entity. I classify
an entity as a theoretical entity, then, if there is a theoretical term that
names it. If theoretical entities are understood in this way, it is not a
category mistake to classify an entity as theoretical, as van Fraassen (1980,
14) claims. HE terms are a proper subset of theoretical terms. Hypothetical
entities, then, are a proper subset of theoretical entities.
Scientific realists are committed to a fairly concrete proposal when it
comes to the semantics of discourse concerning hypothetical entities. In
general, they hold that scientific discourse should be “interpreted
‘realistically,’ ” to use Richard Boyd’s terminology, as involving putatively
referring expressions that have putative reference to empirical entities
(1983, 45).2 Following Boyd, I will use ‘realistic interpretation’ to refer to
this idea. In this case, discourse concerning hypothetical entities should be
interpreted realistically. Hence, on the realist view, Adams and Le Verrier
were referring to Neptune before it was discovered. Lavoisier’s ‘caloric’
failed to refer to any empirical entity. And the jury is still out with regard
to the Higgs boson, but scientists are either referring or failing to refer.
If the language of science is to be interpreted realistically, then the
realist is committed to the following thesis when it comes to understanding
discourse concerning hypothetical entities:
Realism about Hypothetical Entities: HE terms should be
understood as putatively referring expressions that have
putative reference to empirical entities.
Moreover, the realist is committed to the following seemingly exhaustive
trichotomy:
T1 either an HE term, so understood, refers to an empirical
entity;
T2 or it fails to refer to an empirical entity;
2See also Psillos “semantic stance” (1999, xix).
T3 or it ‘kind of’ refers to that entity.3
If it can be shown that there are HE terms that don’t fall within the
taxonomy characterized by this trichotomy, then something is wrong with
the realist account of realistic interpretation.
This commitment to realistic interpretation will be my target in what
follows. In Section 2, I will argue that realistic interpretation does not yield
an adequate framework for understanding discourse concerning
hypothetical entities. In order to show why, I will discuss an episode from
the history of chemistry involving the so-called muriatic radical, which, I
will claim, resists realistic interpretation.
2. Reference and the Muriatic Radical
My goal in this section is to sketch the details of a case involving a
hypothetical entity that doesn’t fall within the realist’s taxonomy. This is
the case of the so-called muriatic radical, which was taken to be the
unknown constituent of muriatic acid, the constitution of which was not
well understood until the early years of the 19th century. After sketching
some of the historical details, I will argue that there is no fact of the matter
3(T3) includes, but is not limited to, views like Psillos’ (1996, S313) ap-
proximate reference and Field’s (1973) partial denotation, which are inter-
mediate between full-blown reference and failure of reference.
about what empirical entity, if any, ‘muriatic radical’ bears a referential
relation to.
A convenient starting point for the story of the muriatic radical is
Antoine Lavoisier’s theory of acidity. Lavoisier develops his theory in a
number of papers,4 but it reached maturity at least by the time he wrote
his Traite´ e´le´mentaire de Chimie, originally published in 1789, and so I will
focus on his formulation of it in that work.5
Lavoisier begins chapter five of part one of the Traite´ with a
discussion of a number of experiments. These experiments show how three
combustible bodies combine with oxygen to form acids. A combustible
body for Lavoisier is just “a body which possesses the power of
decomposing oxygen gas, by attracting the oxygen from the caloric with
which it was combined” (1802, 111). The combustible bodies that Lavoisier
employs in these experiments are phosphorus, sulphur, and carbon, which,
he claims, when combined with oxygen, form phosphoric acid, sulphuric
acid, and carbonic acid, respectively. He labels the process by which these
bodies are converted into acids “oxygenation,” and writes of “oxygenating”
4See, for example, Lavoisier (1776) and Lavoisier (1778).
5In what follows, my quotations are drawn from Robert Kerr’s 1802 trans-
lation.
a combustible body like phosphorus in order to covert it into an
incombustible acid (110–1).
Although Lavoisier could employ more examples, he generalizes to a
theory of acidity from the three mentioned above.
By these [three examples], it may be clearly seen, that oxygen is
an element common to them all, and which constitutes or
produces their acidity; and that they differ from each other,
according to the several natures of the oxygenated or acidified
substances. We must, therefore, in every acid, carefully
distinguish between the acidifiable base, which Mr de Morveau
calls the radical, and the acidifying principle, or oxygen. (114)
There were a number of acids in Lavoisier’s day that were yet to be
decomposed, and so one could not yet prove that they contain oxygen.
Among these acids was the so-called muriatic acid. Lavoisier was
nonetheless fairly certain that this acid could be accommodated by his
theory of acidity. That is to say, he hypothesized that it is made up of
oxygen, the acidifying principle, combined with some unknown acidifiable
base or radical, which he called the ‘muriatic radical.’ Lavoisier discusses
the muriatic radical in the following passage:
Although we have not yet been able, either to compose or to
decompound this acid of sea-salt, we cannot have the smallest
doubt that it, like all other acids, is composed by the union of
oxygen with an acidifiable base. We have therefore called this
unknown substance the muriatic base, or muriatic radical
. . . (121–2)
Based on Lavoisier’s discussion here, we can see that the muriatic radical is
a hypothetical entity according to the rough guide in Section 1. Theoretical
considerations lead Lavoisier to put forward this entity as an empirical
entity, but those considerations were less than decisive.
Lavoisier was also concerned with another as-yet undecomposed acid,
which he thought to be related to muriatic acid. This is the acid he calls
‘oxygenated muriatic acid,’ and what others call ‘oxymuriatic acid.’6
Lavoisier held that two different acids can have the same constituent
elements, and that what makes them different is the different proportions of
those elements that the acids contain. For example, he believed that both
sulphurous acid and sulphuric acid contain nothing but sulphur and
oxygen. What makes them different acids is that the former is
“under-saturated with oxygen,” while the latter is “completely saturated”
(117–8). In the same way, Lavoisier held that oxymuriatic acid results from
a combination of muriatic acid and oxygen, in which case oxymuriatic acid
contains the muriatic radical as well (123–124). To put the point another
6For Lavoisier’s terminology, see Lavoisier (1802, 123–124). For the alter-
native terminology, see, for example, Davy (1810).
way, muriatic acid is “under-saturated with oxygen,” while oxymuriatic
acid is “completely saturated,” though, to be sure, both contain the
muriatic radical.
In 1811, Humphry Davy successfully decomposed muriatic acid
(1811). The results were somewhat surprising. As it turns out, this acid
contains no oxygen, so Lavoisier’s theory was wrong—oxygen is not the
acidifying principle. Muriatic acid actually contains hydrogen and
oxymuriatic acid as its constituents, whereas before, it was thought that
muriatic acid is a constituent of oxymuriatic acid. Since oxymuriatic acid
contains neither oxygen nor muriatic acid, Davy proposed a new name for
it: chlorine (1811, 32). Muriatic acid, then, is what we now call
hydrochloric acid (HCl).
The history that I’ve sketched here spells trouble for the realist
account. If one adopts that account, it’s not at all clear how one would
classify the muriatic radical. To begin with, there are good reasons to think
that ‘muriatic radical’ refers to hydrogen. Lavoisier’s English translator,
Robert Kerr, notes Christoph Girtanner’s claim that hydrogen is the
muriatic radical (Lavoisier 1802, 122). This was about ten years before
Davy’s work, but Davy himself claims that “muriatic acid may be
considered as having hydrogene for its basis, and oxymuriatic acid for its
acidifying principle” (1810, 243). Davy was not alone in this—John Dalton
writes that Davy’s “notion agrees so far with [his], as to make hydrogen the
base of muriatic acid” (1808, 552). In a later paper, Davy notes some
analogies between oxygen and chlorine, which provide support for this
claim. For example, when one uses a Voltaic battery to decompose a
substance, chlorine, oxygen, and acid matter appear at the positive pole,
while hydrogen and alkaline matter appear at the negative pole (Davy
1826, 398). If chlorine is analogous to what Lavoisier thought to be the
acidifying principle, then this leaves hydrogen as the base, in which case
‘muriatic radical’ may be taken to refer to hydrogen.
There are also good reasons to think that ‘muriatic radical’ refers to
chlorine. Although the analogies that Davy mentions suggest that chlorine
is the acidifying principle in muriatic acid, chemistry textbooks at the time
claim that hydrogen is also a principle of acidity. For example, in John
Webster’s 1826 textbook, one finds the following:
[O]xygen is not essential to the acidity of a compound, for some
bodies are rendered acid by union with chlorine, others by
hydrogen; and the theory of Lavoisier which considered oxygen
as the essential principle of acidity, and in conformity to which
its present name was assigned to it can no longer be received as
correct. (1826, 88)
Hence, if one takes hydrogen to be the acidifying principle, that leaves
chlorine as the base or radical of muriatic acid. Some writers have, indeed,
taken chlorine to be the muriatic radical. In the later years of the 19th
century, Josiah Parsons Cooke, a professor of chemistry and mineralogy at
Harvard, identified the muriatic radical with chlorine (1889, 741). And
more recently, Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent has made a similar
identification (1983, 69–70).
Finally, there are good reasons for thinking that ‘muriatic radical’
refers to nothing at all. To see this, recall that Lavoisier held that muriatic
acid is a constituent of oxymuriatic acid. So if, by ‘muriatic radical,’
Lavoisier meant something like ‘that element which combines with oxygen
(the acidifying principle) to form muriatic acid, which, in turn, combines
with oxygen to form oxymuriatic acid,’ there is nothing in the world that
corresponds to this description. Moreover, there are good reasons for
thinking that ‘muriatic acid’ lacks a referent because there is no principle of
acidity. Based on our current understanding of the nature of acids, neither
oxygen nor hydrogen nor chlorine is a principle of acidity. In this case, it’s
pointless to attempt to determine which constituent of muriatic acid is the
base or radical, since we’ve rejected the view that acids are composed of an
acidifying principle and an acidifiable base. This kind of reasoning is
perhaps what leads Hasok Chang to claim that the muriatic radical does
not exist (2011, 417), in which case ‘muriatic radical’ would altogether fail
to refer to an empirical entity.7
We can now examine T1–T3 in light of these reasons. First of all, if
7See also Michela Massimi (2009, 114), who attributes this view to Chang
and Georgette Taylor.
‘muriatic radical’ falls under T1, then it refers to an empirical entity. In
this case, it would refer to either hydrogen or chlorine. But the reasons on
both sides are equally compelling. Insofar as chlorine is the acidifying
principle, hydrogen is the radical. And insofar as hydrogen is the acidifying
principle, chlorine is the radical. It’s not clear what fact could come to light
that would tell us which one really is the radical, especially given the fact
that we’ve rejected Lavoisier’s theory of acidity long ago. In this case,
‘muriatic radical’ would lack a determinate referent, and would therefore
fall short of successful reference to an empirical entity.
Secondly, if ‘muriatic radical’ falls under T2, then it fails to refer to
an empirical entity. Insofar as we no longer accept a theory of acidity
according to which an acid is composed of an acidifying principle combined
with an acidifiable base, this would seem to be the natural conclusion.
However, it may be too uncharitable to demand that Lavoisier be in
possession of one of the (by our lights) correct theories of acidity in order to
successfully refer. Moreover, the present case is not analogous to clear-cut
cases of non-referring terms. In the present case, there are two empirical
entities that are good candidates for what Lavoisier could have been
referring to, namely, hydrogen and chlorine. In this case, there isn’t a
decisive reason to conclude that ‘muriatic radical’ failed altogether to refer
to an empirical entity.
This leaves T3 as the only option. If ‘muriatic radical’ falls under T3,
then it approximately refers to or partially denotes some entity or entities.
In this case, it may be natural to suppose that ‘muriatic radical’
approximately refers to and/or partially denotes both hydrogen and
chlorine. Both of these entities seem to satisfy Psillos’ (1996, S313) criteria
for approximate reference. Both share some of the properties ascribed to
the muriatic radical. For example, both have the property that they enter
into the composition of muriatic acid. Moreover, both are causally
responsible for the phenomena that the muriatic radical was supposed to be
causally responsible for, namely the behavior of muriatic acid. Similar
reasoning would entail that ‘muriatic radical’ partially denotes both
hydrogen and chlorine.
The problem with taking this option is that there are still strong
reasons that suggest that ‘muriatic radical’ never referred to anything, and
bringing in the notions of approximate reference and partial denotation
does nothing to address these reasons. As brilliant as he was, Lavoisier was
simply wrong about the nature of acids—oxygen is not the principle of
acidity. Moreover, Lavoisier, along with other chemists at the time, thought
that the muriatic radical combined with oxygen to form oxygenated
muriatic acid, which turned out to be the element chlorine. The notions of
approximate reference and partial denotation can help us to sidestep the
difficulty of assigning just one referent to ‘muriatic radical.’ But those
notions are unsatisfying insofar as they leave the strong suspicion that
‘muriatic radical’ lacks a referent unaddressed. To put this another way, it’s
not possible for a term to approximately refer to or partially denote two
entities and zero entities simultaneously.
One may get the sense that one option has to be right here, and it’s
just a matter of figuring out which one it is. But any way of deciding the
issue would be artificial in some sense, and would leave some nagging
concerns unaddressed. The case of the muriatic radical therefore poses a
strong challenge to the realist, insofar as it can’t be happily classified
according to the realist’s proposed taxonomy. The realist may admit the
challenge, and devote her efforts to answering it. But given that it’s not
clear what kind of fact could possibly come to light that would decide this
issue, a more natural conclusion to draw is that there is no fact of the
matter about what, if anything, ‘muriatic radical’ refers to. And if this is
the case, then the realist view is flawed—the notion of realistic
interpretation cannot make sense of scientific discourse concerning
hypothetical entities like the muriatic radical.8
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